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Abstract
The alt-right White Nationalist movement, which
emerged in response to the election of America’s
first Black president, adopted Twitter from the outset.
Tracing its evolution over eight years in retweets,
our study suggests that the movement was relatively
small and factionalized until 2015—but its subgroups
closed ranks following Donald Trump’s candidacy and
became a blowhorn for his campaign. Integrating
social network theory with the emerging view of race
and politics as dynamic processes, our study advances
a “technosocial” understanding of White Nationalism
and its journey from the fringes to the center stage of
American politics.
1. Introduction
In the middle of August 2016, as he trailed Hillary
Clinton in opinion polls nationally as well as in key
battleground states, Donald Trump decided to hire Steve
Bannon, editor of Brietbart News, as the chief executive
of his campaign to become the 45th U.S. president.
Within a week, a strange-sounding term began to
spike in Google Search: “alt-right.” Not too long
ago, Bannon had called his conservative website—an
avid mouthpiece for Trump and his racially tinged
populism—“the platform for the alt-right” [1].
But it wasn’t until Bannon’s elevation from
cheerleader to CEO that “alt-right” registered a seismic
jump in Google Trends, which tracks the frequency of
Google search keywords [2]. Suddenly, it seemed as
if everyone was talking about it. But the term wasn’t
all that new—nor was the phenomenon it represented.
It was coined almost eight years earlier, in a speech
delivered by conservative iconoclast Paul Gottfried to
the H.L. Mencken Club’s annual meeting, titled “The
Decline and Rise of the Alternative Right” [3]. The
dates of this meeting are revealing: November 21-23,
2008, or two weeks after the United States elected
its first Black president in Barack Obama. Gottfried
blamed the George W. Bush-era “neo”conservatives for
abandoning traditional conservative values and paving
the way for Obama, and called for “an attempt to
put together an independent intellectual Right, one that
exists without movement establishment funding and is
also full of young thinkers and activists” (para. 1).
The idea caught on. A stream of young and
not-so-young thinkers and activists started to close ranks
around the nebulous agenda of reviving old-school
conservatism—an “alt-right” that was simultaneously
American, Christian, and White in orientation [4]. They
dreamed the revanchist dream of a pristine nation, free
from Muslims and Jews and Hispanics and immigrants
of other hues, and yearned for a “tough leader” who
would shun the political correctness of establishment
conservatives and blithely embrace a masculine White
identity [5]. When Trump burst on the political
firmament in 2015 and lay claim to the Republican
Party candidature for presidency, he was ridiculed by
most other Republicans as well as the mainstream
media. No one seemed to take him seriously. But
the alt-right—perhaps more appropriately called White
Nationalists—was the constituency he championed;
they adopted him and ultimately helped him not only
trounce his Republican rivals in the party primaries but
also win the presidency in 2016.
The emergence of the alt-right reflects and reinforces
three “great divides” in American society. One is the
well-known conservative versus liberal divide, which
has been there for a long time but has taken on a sharper
edge because of the success of White Nationalists.
The second is the divide within the conservative ranks,
between the so-called “neo”conservatives of the Bush
era and the alt-right “paleo”conservatives who want to
return to what they perceive as traditional conservative
values. The third is the divide(s) within the alt-right
itself. The movement is not a monolith but a medley
of subgroups such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazis, the
Neo-confederates, and followers of significant leaders
such as Dr. David Duke, a former KKK “grand wizard”
as well as an ex-Congressman [6].
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This last divide is the least understood or
documented—and therefore the focus of our empirical
analysis. We start with the assumption that these divides
are not simply ideological but “technosocial”—shaped
by social forces such as politics and race as well
as the affordances of information and communication
technologies. Therefore, our study traces the evolution
of White Nationalism on Twitter—a microblogging
platform not only favored by Trump [7] but where the
alt-right has been active since its inception [8]. We focus
on an eight-year period, beginning with the emergence
of the movement itself in the earliest days of the Obama
presidency in 2009 and going all the way through 2016.
Specifically, we examine the growth of alt-right
subgroups and the movement overall in retweets—or
repostings of a Twitter user’s post by other users, which
are widely recognized as a means of group formation
[9, 10]. Adopting a longitudinal design, we identify
the moments in time at which retweets grew sizeably.
This enables us to distinguish the contextual reasons
for the movement’s evolution. Next, we examine
the evolving structure of the White Nationalist social
network and changes in the propensity of different
subgroups to retweet each other over time. This allows
us to explain how social phenomena such as politics and
race—viewed as the social “processes” of polarization
and racialization, respectively [11, 12]—interacted with
technological affordances such as retweeting and the
constitution of “weak” and “strong” network ties [13,
14] to push White Nationalism from the fringes to the
center stage of American politics.
2. Polarization on Twitter
Scholarship on the socio-political impact of
digital technologies often draws on the ideal of the
Habermasian public sphere, hailing the internet in
general and social networking sites (SNSs) like
Twitter in particular as positive influences on both
representational and direct forms of democracy [15, 16].
But this liberal-idealist view has come to be challenged
[17]. A growing body of research suggests that instead
of an open network of individuals sharing ideas freely
and engaging in rational deliberations, SNSs are in fact a
confederation of small, self-contained bubbles—“echo
chambers”—within which homogeneous members
speak with and listen to each other [18]. These echo
chambers are often based on partisan or ideological
affiliations—liberal or conservative—and serve to
reinforce their members’ limited worldviews. Thus,
even as SNSs boost political participation, they also
entrench political polarization—indeed, polarization
is a key factor predicting participation online [19].
Research focusing on how online self-expression
influences the “expressers” themselves—rather than
their audience—also bolsters this contention. As Cho
and colleagues found, political expressions on SNS “(a)
reinforce the expressers’ partisan thought process and
(b) harden their pre-existing political preferences” [20].
Polarization is neither a new phenomenon nor
limited to SNSs. The theory of homophily has long
suggested that human beings tend to connect with others
like themselves and selectively expose themselves
to information that reinforces their worldviews [21].
But SNSs may have exacerbated this tendency [22].
Importantly, online echo chambers don’t simply exist
to the left- or right-of-center—they come into being
toward the far ends of the political spectrum. Twitter, in
particular, has become closely associated with political
polarization. Leaders espousing extreme ideological
positions were among the earliest adopters of Twitter
[23]. Such politicians tend to have significantly more
Twitter followers [24]. They are also more successful at
raising campaign funds on Twitter than their moderate
peers [25]. In addition, polarized members tend to
dominate Twitter “and are responsible for the majority
of tweets received overall due to their popularity and
activity” [26].
Social psychologists have argued that conservatives
are more likely than liberals to be polarized and
drift toward extreme ideological positions—on account
of their deeper need to reduce threat and existential
uncertainty [27]. Research on SNS-based echo
chambers also supports this view [28]. Barber and
colleagues’ [29] “big data” analysis of nearly 150
million tweets about 12 political and nonpolitical issues
revealed that “liberals are significantly more likely
than conservatives to participate in cross-ideological
dissemination” of information (p. 10). Also,
conservative polarization is more likely to happen in
retweet networks—or networks formed when Twitter
users repost other users’ messages—than mention
networks, formed when users simply mention each
other’s Twitter handles in their posts [9].
3. Racialization on Twitter
The virtual was once heralded as freedom from
the confines imposed by the physical—the “ultimate
flight from the body cage” [30] (p. 271). But that
view no longer sustains. Body color, in particular,
has remained an inescapable feature of virtual reality.
No other phenomenon illustrates this better than the
so-called “Black Twitter.” The notion that Blackness
had something to do with Twitter started with a Pew
study [31] that came out just three years after the
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platform’s launch in 2006. It noted that 26 percent
of African-Americans who were online were already
using Twitter, compared with 18 percent Hispanics and
19 percent Whites. Soon, a spate of media articles
popularized the idea of “Black Twitter”—arguing that
Blacks didn’t just use Twitter more, but they also used
it unlike anyone else. As Manjoo [32] explained, “They
form tighter clusters on the network—they follow one
another more readily, they retweet each other more
often, and more of their posts are @-replies—posts
directed at other users” (para. 6).
Most descriptions of Black Twitter treat Blackness
as an a priori identity that “Black people” already
possess, and that leads them to use Twitter in a certain
way. But such a view “largely ignores the properties
of the networked online environment that Black users
act in” [33] (p. 52). Instead, Sharma [33] argues
for a “technosocial” approach to understanding Black
Twitter, which does not ignore the “materiality” of
offline Black bodies but also pays attention to the
materiality of digital technologies, imposed through
the manner in which their algorithms operate. In
this approach, digital technologies such as SNSs don’t
simply reflect or replicate extant racial categories.
Instead, they “generate” race by producing the identities
of subjects in and through interactive action. This
technosocial view coheres with the idea of racialization,
or “the changing meanings of race within different
political, social, and economic contexts, producing a
more expansive and complex discussion of race” [12]
(p. 648). Racialization departs from race as a static
phenomenon and focuses instead on the social process
by which racial identities as well as their meanings and
power asymmetries come into being [11].
Many cultural critics have also questioned the surfeit
of media and academic attention to Black Twitter, noting
that it reinforces Blackness as a “deviant” identity—in
contrast to Whiteness, which is deemed “normal” and
therefore in no need of scrutiny [34]. This is indeed
a long-standing concern in race and ethnic studies,
where “ ‘White’ is a relatively uncharted territory that
has remained invisible as it continues to influence the
identity of those both within and without its domain”
[35] (p. 291). In recent years, more scholars have started
putting Whiteness under the scanner to understand what
it means and how these meanings come into being [36].
Lyubansky [37] identified three components of
Whiteness in the American context—racial identity,
racial bias, and racial privilege. As a racial identity,
Whiteness is often unnoticed, especially by White
people themselves, who “much more strongly prefer
to identify as ‘American’ or as a humanist than as
‘white”’ (para. 4). Nonetheless, a number of
psychological implicit association tests have showed
that White people exhibit “unconscious (and therefore
unintentional) bias in favor of those who are white, a
bias that is either not evident or significantly smaller,
in non-white groups” (para. 5; see also [38]). Finally,
Whiteness comes along with a range of privileges, in
particular “the privilege to assume that whiteness is the
norm against which everyone else should be compared”
(para. 6). These features suggest that even though
White Nationalism may be relatively new as an explicit
political ideology, the implicit conflation of Whiteness
with nationalism as a social identification—an example
of racialization—isn’t all that new and is, in fact, deeply
pervasive in American society.
In a study of online extremism, Berger [6] reported
an explosion of White Nationalism on Twitter. Driven
by the fear of White genocide, or the notion that the
“White race” is directly endangered by the increasing
diversity of American society—it has added tens
of thousands of followers in the past few years.
It was also “heavily invested in Donald Trump’s
presidential campaign,” with “Trump-related hashtags
outperform[ing] every white nationalist hashtag except
for whitegenocide” (p. 3). Berger’s report was
based on the analysis of more than 25,000 accounts
that were followers of 18 “seed” accounts of White
Nationalists—identified by the author’s own research
as well as data from the Anti-Defamation League and
Southern Poverty Law Center. Berger also found White
Nationalists on Twitter to be heavily factionalized and
classified the seed accounts into six subgroups: Ku
Klux Klan; Nazi; Neo-Confederate; Significant Leaders;
Other Ideologies; and Other Institutions.
4. Ties, Clusters, and Networks
In this study, we examine White Nationalism as
a technosocial phenomenon and trace its evolution on
Twitter to identify particular social and technical factors
that led to its diffusion. To do so, we integrate
the recent research on polarization and racialization
online with ideas from social network theory. Social
networks are comprised of dyadic relationships, or
ties, between individual members, also known as
nodes. Together, the ties provide the network with an
overarching structure. Ties between members differ by
their “strength”—defined as the “combination of the
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy
(mutual confidence), and the reciprocal services which
characterize the tie” [13] (p. 1361). On Twitter, for
instance, people who often reply to, mention, or retweet
each other have a strong tie, while those who do so
infrequently have a weak tie. In any large network, there
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is often a fair mix of strong and weak ties. Members
who have strong ties with each other form clusters,
or closely-interconnected groups within the network,
which are linked to other such groups through weak ties
between a few members across groups. As a result,
strong ties are also called “bonding ties” while weak
ties are known as “bridging ties” because they bridge
the distance across groups in a network.
The structure of the network influences how
information or collective behavior diffuses across it.
Scholars have argued that people with strong ties tend
to be quite similar and therefore don’t have anything
new to share with each other. Such ties are therefore
“redundant.” On the other hand, people with weak ties
are often dissimilar in their behaviors and the kinds of
information they are able to share. That means weak ties
can help “new” information quickly disseminate across
a network—information that arrives in one cluster of
the network can travel to other clusters through these
bridging ties and diffuse across the network. According
to Granovetter [13], “whatever is to be diffused can
reach a larger number of people, and traverse a greater
social distance, when passed through weak ties rather
than strong” (p. 1366). A number of later studies have
supported this theory, known as the strength of weak ties
[39]. Watts and Strogatz [40] showed that even a small
percentage of weak ties is sufficient to make information
and collective behaviors disseminate across a network.
Some studies have, however, also found that while
weak ties are important for individuals to be exposed
to new information, it is the strong and so-called
“redundant” ties that better predict the propensity
to share information—especially via retweets [10].
These studies imply that Twitter users don’t only—or
even typically—share information because it is new.
Instead, other motivations are at play. As Harrigan
and colleagues [10] concluded, “individuals within a
community tend to be similar ... thus increasing
the relevance of, and attention paid to, each other’s
messages” (p. 478). “Redundant” information
from like-minded tweeters may be more commonly
retweeted within community structures because its very
redundancy allows Twitter users to reinforce community
bonds and signal their identification with other members
of the community.
The dynamics of networked action thus closely
resemble the sociopolitical processes of polarization and
racialization—specifically the act of sharing information
from particular sources, or retweeting, as a means
of locating oneself within particular ideological/racial
subgroups or clusters. A close scrutiny of the evolution
of the White Nationalist retweet network, which pays
attention to the changing patterns of retweeting activity
over time as well as changes in the structural features of
the retweet network, can therefore reveal how and why
the “alt-right” became a significant political force in the
run up to the 2016 election and helped Donald Trump
become president. To guide our inquiry, we propose the
following research questions:
RQ1a: How did the retweet frequencies of alt-right
posts change over time?
RQ1b: How did the retweet frequencies of alt-right
subgroups change over time?
RQ2a: How did the alt-right retweet network change
over time?
RQ2b: How did cross-retweets of alt-right
subgroups change over time?
5. Method
Our point of departure was Berger’s [6]
classification of 18 “seed” White Nationalist
accounts into six subgroups: Ku Klux Klan
(@ukanw, @ukasouthfla, @kkkofficial311); Nazi
(@nsm88, @anp14, @nsfm commander, @natall adv);
Neo-Confederate (@dixienetdotorg, @cofcc76,
@occdissent); Significant Leaders (@drdavidduke,
@whitakeronline); Other Ideologies (@nationsaryan,
@tcmchurch, @creatoralliance); and Other Institutions
(@nwfront, @stormfrontwpww, @american3rdp). All
public retweets of the original tweets from these seed
accounts, posted over an eight-year period—January 1,
2009 to December 31, 2016—were collected through
Twitter’s Firehose. The Firehose provides access to
100 percent of Twitter data published over a specified
time period, as opposed to Twitter’s search and
streaming APIs that only provide limited access [41].
Retweets were captured using the patented algorithmic
technology of Crimson Hexagon’s platform. We used
boyd, Golder, and Lotan’s [42] rubric for determining
retweets (‘RT: @’, ‘retweet @’, ‘retweeting @’, ‘(via
@)’, ‘RT (via @)’, ‘thx @’, ‘HT @’, and ‘r @’). In
total, 321,718 retweets were collected (see Table 1).
After mining the data, we relied on social network
analysis and primary duplication to test our hypotheses.
Social network analysis is not a specific method but
“a loose federation of approaches” to study patterns of
relations among social actors (Burt, 1980). We followed
Shumate and colleagues’ [43] “relational, systemic,
and contextual” approach to social network analysis,
which steps away from agent-centric approaches and
focuses instead on illustrating and explaining emergent
patterns of social structures (for a discussion of different
approaches, see [44]. Each tweet was coded as an
arc with the seed account as the “target” and any
tweeter who retweeted a seed account’s tweet as the
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Table 1. Retweet Frequency
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total per account
Ku Klux Klan 668 105 18 14 74 879
kkkofficial311 - - - 2 72 74
ukanw 588 63 - 2 - 653
ukasouthfla 80 42 18 10 2 152
Nazi 15 845 1,591 2,643 3,578 3,786 5,477 17,935
apn14 6 837 1,540 2,284 3,570 3,500 4,702 16,439
nsm88 9 7 8 6 8 285 775 1,098
nsfm commander - 1 43 353 - - - 397
natall adv 1 1
Neo-Confederate 98 264 3,543 6,746 7,303 9,785 20,937 48,676
cofcc76 - 156 1,699 5,148 5,642 5,498 790 18,933
dicienetdotorg - 1 - - 2 3 8 14
occdissent 98 107 1,844 1,598 1,659 4,284 20,139 29,729
Significant Leaders 4 36 203 215 2,085 11,144 230,235 243,922
whitakeronline 2 20 203 213 153 213 195 999
drdavidduke 2 16 - 2 1,932 10,931 230,040 242,923
Other Ideologies 2 - 46 195 84 1,239 937 2,503
CreatorAlliance - - 40 191 81 1,231 929 2,472
nationsaryan - - 6 4 - 6 8 24
tcmchurch 2 - - - 3 2 7
Other Institutions 59 421 3,150 214 875 799 1,312 973 7,803
american3rdp - - - 148 794 711 1,195 893 3,741
nwfront - 5 12 16 31 20 21 29 134
stormfrontwpww 59 416 3,138 50 50 68 96 51 3,928
Total per year 59 540 4,295 6,265 10,779 13,867 27,280 258,633 321,718
“source.” Most seed accounts had not come online
until 2012 and the frequency of retweets was also
fairly low until then. Therefore, we focused our
social network analysis on the 2012-2016 period. Five
bipartite network graphs—one for each year—with two
kinds of vertices—seed accounts and retweeters—were
generated. We used the statistical program R and
network visualization tool Gephi for the analysis.
While social network analysis allowed us to
visualize the network as a whole and understand its
clustered structure based on the extent of retweets within
clusters, primary duplication helped us measure the
precise degree of retweeting between seed categories.
The idea of primary duplication is borrowed from media
audience studies. It is meant to analyze the extent to
which an audience member who consumes one media
outlet also consumes a second outlet [45]. Its earliest
application was Webster’s [46] study of subsets of
television programs watched by the same set of audience
members. We used this concept to illustrate the extent
to which a Twitter user who retweets one seed category
i also retweets a second seed category j, where the row
is defined as i and the column as j (see Tables 2a-2e).
To conduct primary duplication, bipartite networks were
converted into a whole network with the seed accounts
as nodes and shared retweeters as edges. When using
primary duplication, it is important to remember which
category is treated as i and which as j—as the proportion
of i retweeters who also retweet j need not be the same
as the proportion of j retweeters who retweet i [47].
6. Results
6.1. Retweet Frequencies
Our first research question (RQ1a) focused on
tracing the overall trajectory of White Nationalist
retweets over time. A year-by-year frequency analysis
showed that the retweets of messages originally posted
by the 18 seed accounts grew exponentially—from 59
in 2009 to 258,633 in 2016 (see Table 1). While retweet
numbers increased every year, they spurted sharply in
2015 (197 percent from the preceding year) before
exploding in 2016 (948 percent). This growth is partly
explained by the increasing numbers of seed accounts.
Only one seed account—@stormfrontwpww, belonging
to an organization called Stormfront with the slogan
“White Pride World Wide” was active in 2009. But
more seed accounts came online in the next three years
and 15 were active by 2012. The number of tweets
posted by these accounts also grew accordingly, thus
providing many more tweets that could be retweeted.
The growth in retweets also coincides with Trump’s
presidential campaign, which was launched mid-year in
2015 and scored one victory after another, culminating
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with his election in November 2016.
Analyzing retweets at the level of subgroups (RQ1b)
revealed more nuanced patterns. Not all the subgroups
grew similarly or simultaneously. Ku Klux Klan’s
retweet numbers were the highest in 2012, the year in
which two of its three seed accounts came online, but
then they began to decline. Two more subgroups—Other
Ideologies and Other Institutions—witnessed both ups
and downs in retweets over these years. But the three
remaining subgroups—Nazis, Neo-confederates, and
Significant Leaders—enjoyed steady growth from 2010,
when most of their accounts came online, through 2016.
We also found sharp differences in the retweeting
fortunes of accounts that made up these subgroups.
Two patterns in particular stand out. First, retweets
of messages posted by a single account under
Significant Leaders—@drdavidduke, belonging to Dr.
David Duke, a former KKK “grand wizard” and
ex-Congressman—effectively drove the spurts in 2015
and 2016, growing year-on-year by 566 percent and
2,104 percent respectively. Second, 2012 was a
pivotal moment for the movement. The overall
growth of retweets this year was a modest 146
percent. But if we excluded the retweets of a single
account—@stormfrontwpww, which was quite popular
in 2011 but whose retweets dwindled dramatically after
that—then year-on-year growth in 2012 was a much
higher 537 percent.
The analysis of retweet frequencies leads us to some
interesting insights, especially when viewed alongside
“offline” political and social developments. First, while
the alt-right movement started at the end of 2008 as a
reaction to President Obama’s election [3], it remained
relatively nascent in the first few years. But the prospect
of Obama’s re-election in 2012 appears to have given the
movement another jolt of life—both online and offline.
As our analysis shows, this was the year a number
of seed alt-right accounts became active and retweet
activity jumped more than five times (after excluding
@stormfrontwpww). Interestingly, this was also the
year when Trayvon Martin, a Black teenager in Sanford,
Florida, was gunned down by George Zimmerman—the
first of a series of high-profile shootings of Black youths
by White police officers and vigilantes across the United
States leading up to the 2016 election.
Second, even as the White Nationalist ideology
kept growing through the years, it was searching for
a political leader who would adopt its bigoted stance
without worrying about political correctness. No such
leader emerged in 2012, and White Nationalists had to
wait for someone like Trump to arrive on the scene.
His campaign and eventual nomination came as a shot
in the arm for their ideology, as evident in the spurts
in their retweet frequencies in 2015 and 2016. This
implies that Trump was able to tap into an ideology
that was already deeply entrenched. In other words,
Trump didn’t create White Nationalism as is sometimes
assumed—although he clearly helped bring it from the
fringes to the mainstream.
Third, the White Nationalist ideology has multiple
strains and not all of them became equally popular
online. Nazi and Neo-confederate seed accounts
enjoyed continuous growth, as did one of the Significant
Leaders, Dr. David Duke. Meanwhile, the Ku Klux
Klan’s retweet frequencies declined. This suggests
that while White Nationalism is often viewed from
the outside as a single cohesive movement, there are
sharp divisions within and these divisions matter to their
followers.
6.2. Retweet Network and Cross-Cluster
Retweets
We next asked how the network constituted by
retweets of White Nationalist seed accounts changed
over time (RQ2a). As only a few of the seed accounts
had come online by 2011 and retweeting was relatively
low, social network analysis focused on the period of
2012 through 2016. It was supplemented by primary
duplication, which yielded precise measurements of
cross-cluster retweets (RQ2b) and enabled us to better
understand the reasons behind the evolving structure of
the network. We found that the network went through
three stages in this period.
Polarized Crowds. Two clusters representing
two White Nationalist subgroups—Nazis and
Neo-confederates—dominated the network in 2012 and
2013—as evident from the size of their names (Figure
1). Although these clusters were connected with other
White Nationalist clusters and were thus part of the
same overall social network, there were very few ties
between these two. At this stage, the White Nationalist
network resembled what Smith and colleagues [48]
called “polarized crowds” in their typology of Twitter
networks—comprising two big and dense clusters that
are mostly disconnected from each other and rely on
distinct sources for information. Primary duplication
showed that in 2012 and 2013, mid to high percentages
of Nazi retweeters retweeted posts from most other
subgroups except the Neo-confederates (Table 2a, 2b).
Conversely, mid to high percentages of Neo-confederate
retweeters also retweeted the messages of most other
subgroups—except Nazis. Interestingly, the Nazis and
Neo-confederates were not retweeted nearly as much
by other subgroups. Their dominance in this period
was, therefore, driven by their retweeters’ proclivity to
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retweet other subgroups.
Figure 1. Changing structure of the alt-right Twitter
network.
Community Clusters. The network structure
changed in 2014 with the emergence of Significant
Leaders as a third major cluster, which continued
to grow and rivaled the dominance of the Nazi and
Neo-confederate clusters in 2015. In these two years,
the network took the form of “community clusters,”
comprising multiple subgroups that form around a
few hubs—each having its own members and sources
of information [48]. Such a network illustrates
“diverse angles on a subject based on its relevance to
different audiences, revealing a diversity of opinion and
perspective” (p. 3). Interconnections exist, but are
very low compared with the intensity of ties within
each cluster. In line with these characteristics, primary
duplication revealed an overall drop in cross-cluster
retweets in 2014 and 2015 (Tables 2c & 2d). Nazi
and Neo-confederate retweeters’ retweets of other
subgroups slowed down compared with the previous
stage. However, Significant Leaders’ retweeters began
retweeting other subgroups more, particularly in 2015,
contibuting to the subgroup’s emergence as a major
cluster and transforming the network in the process.
Broadcast Network. The Significant Leaders
cluster continued to expand and, in 2016, became
the single dominant cluster. Retweets of Nazi
and Neo-confederate clusters grew this year as well.
But Significant Leaders, specifically the account
@drdavidduke, was retweeted so heavily in 2016
that it effectively turned the network structure into a
“broadcast network”—with a single, distinct hub whose
tweets were reposted by an overwhelming majority
of other members [48]. Such a highly centralized
structure, with outward spokes, indicates that the White
Nationalist Twitter network effectively functioned as
a single-voice megaphone for the Trump campaign in
2016. Primary duplication (Table 2e) indicated that
high proportions of retweeters of Significant Leaders
were also retweeting other subgroups—explaining this
cluster’s dominance in the network.
Social network analysis and primary duplication
thus reinforce some of the indications of frequency
analysis while providing several new insights of
their own. First, while Berger [6] classified White
Nationalist seed accounts into subgroups based on
their self-identification as KKK, Nazi and so on, our
study suggests that these identifications have “real”
meanings and they influence online interactions among
White Nationalists. Retweeting within subgroups is
consistently higher than across subgroups, a process that
organically creates subgroup-oriented clusters within
the White Nationalist social network. Although the
clusters do interact, the near-complete absence of
cross retweets between Nazis and Neo-confederates—at
least until 2015—suggests the two subgroups were
sharply polarized. Second, the subgroups—even Nazis
and Neo-confederates—were willing to give up their
differences and congeal into a strong broadcast network
in 2016. Herein lies Trump’s true impact on White
Nationalism: he managed to unite the alt-right factions
into a powerful blowhorn for his candidacy.
7. Discussion
We set out to trace the evolution of the alt-right,
or White Nationalism, on Twitter between 2009 and
2016—a period in which it moved from the margins to
the center stage of American politics. Specifically, we
looked at the diffusion of the movement in retweets.
As our empirical analysis indicates, both social and
technological forces shaped the movement’s evolution.
These are closely intertwined and best regarded as
“technosocial.” Here, we will parse them for closer
scrutiny.
First, the social. While Obama’s election in 2008
kickstarted White Nationalism as an explicit political
ideology—both offline and online [3, 6]—our analysis
suggests that the movement’s evolution was initially
a slow process. There wasn’t much activity until
2011. But the prospect of Obama’s re-election in 2012
galvanized the movement—again both offline (in the
form of high-profile killings of Black youth by White
police officers and self-appointed vigilantes) and online
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Table 2a. Simple Primary Duplication Matrix, 2012 (%)
Variable Ku Klux Klan Nazi Neo-confederate Significant Leaders Other Ideologies Other Institutions
KKK - 5.17 3.75 28.57 47.37 11.50
Nazi 42.67 - 4.72 33.33 31.58 15.04
Neo-conf 41.33 6.30 - 61.90 63.16 32.74
Sig. Leaders 8.00 1.13 1.57 - 21.05 3.54
Other Ideo’s 12.00 0.97 1.45 19.05 - 2.65
Other Inst’s 17.33 2.75 4.47 19.05 15.79 -
Table 2b. Simple Primary Duplication Matrix, 2013 (%)
Variable Ku Klux Klan Nazi Neo-confederate Significant Leaders Other Ideologies Other Institutions
KKK - 1.21 0.69 2.70 10.17 4.35
Nazi 27.27 - 5.60 10.81 44.07 35.18
Neo-conf 25.00 8.96 - 56.76 42.37 49.01
Sig. Leaders 2.27 0.40 1.32 - 3.39 8.30
Other Ideo’s 13.64 2.62 1.57 5.41 - 9.88
Other Inst’s 15.91 3.02 7.80 32.43 23.73 -
(in the form of more White Nationalist accounts going
live and retweeting expanding quickly). The movement
grew steadily after that. Trump’s candidacy came as a
shot in the arm for White Nationalists, boosting retweets
exponentially in 2015 and 2016.
Our study shows that White Nationalism is a
rainbow rather than a cloud, comprising multiple
subgroups. These subgroups interact with each other,
but they can also be sharply divided—as was the
case with Nazis and Neo-confederates, at least until
2015. Trump didn’t create White Nationalism, as
is sometimes assumed: he tapped into a movement
that was already growing as a reaction to Obama’s
presidency. But Trump’s intervention brought White
Nationalist subgroups together and fused them into a
broadcast network that served as a blowhorn for his
candidacy. This structural transformation is perhaps the
reason why White Nationalism had such a strong impact
on the 2016 election.
Our study also illustrates how racialization and
polarization unfold as social processes—interlocking
multiple meanings that themselves keep evolving over
time. Different subgroups of White Nationalists
combined Whiteness and Americanness in different
ways. Some were more successful than others. But none
remained stagnant. White Nationalism, as a far-right
movement, supposes itself to be driven by affixed and
absolutist notions of race and nationhood—and that
is what it propagates. But in practice, even its own
adherents have unstable identities that they constantly
negotiate in emerging contexts.
Second, the technical. Our study illustrates
the implications of regarding retweeting as identity
construction. Racial identification, as Sharma [33]
observed, “is discovered in its emergence through
connections between bodies, and other entities and
processes” (p. 54). Saldanha [49] further explained
racialization as “a particular spatiotemporal disciplining
and charging” of bodies, which in turn “collectively start
behaving like situationally distinct aggregates—racial
formations, racial clusters” (p. 190). Retweeting is the
algorithmic conduit of such disciplining and charging of
bodies.
Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates how the
structure of the network bears upon racialization and
polarization—and how weak and strong ties play
different yet complementary roles in this dynamic
process. Weak “bridging” ties allow new meanings
of White Nationalism to diffuse across clusters and
racialization and polarization to take place over time
[13, 39]. But this process requires two contingent
conditions. One, new meanings diffuse across a
network only when weak ties exist across all clusters
in the network. The absence of weak ties across
particular clusters, as was the case between Nazis
and Neo-confederates until 2015, can circumvent the
process. Two, weak ties are able to diffuse new
meanings across a network only when they connect
individuals who are embedded within clusters with
strong “bonding” ties. Most of the retweeting
takes places within such strong-tie clusters despite
their high levels of information redundancy, as some
previous studies have also found [9, 10]. Thus, both
weak and strong ties operate simultaneously and in
complementary ways to precipitate racialization and
polarization.
The limitations of our study can serve as avenues
for future research. First, Berger [6] noted that
his list of “seed” White Nationalist accounts, on
which we rely, might not be comprehensive. Future
research may identify additional seed accounts and
incorporate them into the analysis of the White
Nationalist network. Second, we have examined the
network formed through retweeting—which is not the
only form of social interaction afforded by Twitter.
Retweets signify endorsement, but interaction through
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Table 2c. Simple Primary Duplication Matrix, 2014 (%)
Variable Ku Klux Klan Nazi Neo-confederate Significant Leaders Other Ideologies Other Institutions
KKK - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nazi 0.00 - 4.28 8.19 20.75 8.86
Neo-conf 0.00 4.58 - 21.42 33.96 46.20
Sig. Leaders 0.00 2.52 6.15 - 28.30 13.61
Other Ideo’s 0.00 0.63 0.96 2.79 - 4.43
Other Inst’s 0.00 1.60 7.81 8.01 26.42 -
Table 2d. Simple Primary Duplication Matrix, 2015 (%)
Variable Ku Klux Klan Nazi Neo-confederate Significant Leaders Other Ideologies Other Institutions
KKK - 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.00
Nazi 27.27 - 5.81 10.02 33.94 12.24
Neo-conf 18.18 11.12 - 19.00 33.94 42.45
Sig. Leaders 27.27 17.63 17.47 - 38.53 35.95
Other Ideo’s 0.00 2.71 1.41 1.75 - 3.44
Other Inst’s 0.00 4.68 8.49 7.82 16.51 -
Table 2e. Simple Primary Duplication Matrix, 2016 (%)
Variable Ku Klux Klan Nazi Neo-confederate Significant Leaders Other Ideologies Other Institutions
KKK - 0.15 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.36
Nazi 4.35 - 2.75 0.90 19.00 10.12
Neo-conf 20.29 10.07 - 4.72 24.00 38.19
Sig. Leaders 39.13 36.44 52.15 - 64.00 59.86
Other Ideo’s 0.00 0.95 0.33 0.08 - 1.78
Other Inst’s 2.90 2.84 2.92 0.41 10.00 -
“replies” or “mentions” are more complex in their
signification. Studying the networks they produce can,
for instance, help understand the interaction between
White Nationalists and other social groups. Third,
closer attention to the content of White Nationalist
tweets can help answer new research questions that
emerge from our analysis: for instance, why Nazi and
Neo-confederate clusters were so sharply divided and
why Dr. David Duke (@drdavidduke), in particular,
managed to become the hub of the retweet network in
2016. Finally, the key implications of our study—the
organic dichotomies within the White Nationalist
movement and how they evolved over time—ought to be
examined outside of Twitter as well, especially in offline
contexts [50].
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